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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the application of the equilibrium displacement model (EDM) to estimate ex-
ante the welfare effects of biological productivity growth for semi-subsistence crop and its impact on 
poverty reduction. The conventionally used EDM is compared with an alternative EDM that reflects more 
realistic assumptions for African semi-subsistence crops, such as the shape and shift of supply curve, 
significant margins due to high transportation costs between farmgate and consumption market, as well as 
between different consumption markets, and the degree of precisions of estimated structural parameters. 
The application to the dataset for Benin cassava farmers provides an example that the conventional EDM 
may significantly overestimate the total welfare gains, and may also lead to very different interpretation 
of how pro-poor the technology is. 
Keywords:  equilibrium displacement model, pivotal shift, cassava, semisubsistence, market 
margins, double buffering 
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1.  INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Biotechnology, including genetic modification (GM), has the potential to significantly increase the yield 
of many orphan crops, such as cassava, in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA). Public research on semisubsistence 
crops like cassava can greatly influence the development of pro-poor technologies, because 
semisubsistence cassava producers are often the most impoverished citizens of even the low-income 
countries.  
Cassava is a generally nontraded, semisubsistence crop. This fact helps us roughly identify that 
cassava productivity growth often benefits consumers rather than producers, particularly when the 
demand for those crops is inelastic, leading to a sharper decline in the crop’s price. The scale-neutral 
productivity growth for semisubsistence crops may, however, benefit producers, because producers also 
benefit as consumers (Hayami and Herdt 1977; Norton, Ganoza, and Pomareda 1987; Qaim 2001; Andreu 
et al. 2006). The equilibrium displacement model (EDM) is often used to estimate ex ante welfare effects 
for both producers and consumers.  
The literature often employs an EDM with several restrictive and inappropriate assumptions 
about semisubsistence producers; this model is called conventional EDM (CEDM). Among the key 
assumptions for CEDM, this discussion paper focuses on (1) the linear supply curve, (2) productivity 
growth as expressed by a parallel shift in supply curve, and (3) zero market margins (in which producers 
and consumers face a single price).
1
The literature raises questions regarding these restrictive and inappropriate assumptions, even 
though they are often employed to facilitate the estimation of welfare gains. Market margins can be 
significantly large and can have complicated structures in the semisubsistence crop market (Barrett 2008). 
Several lines of theoretical reasoning can also invalidate assumptions that result when a linear supply 
curve and a parallel shift in the supply curve are used as opposed to other forms, such as pivotal shifts, 
particularly for biological productivity growth (Lindner and Jarrett 1978; Rose 1980). Little is known 
about how CEDM can cause biases in estimated benefits for these productivity growths and how big such 
biases can be. Pro-poorness of the distribution of benefit is another important measurement for 
productivity growth of crops like cassava (Nweke, Spencer, and Lynam 2002; Johnson, Masters, and 
Prekel, 2006); CEDM can provide an incorrect evaluation of such pro-poorness of the technology because 
it employs more restrictive assumptions on the heterogeneity of producers. An empirical exercise is thus 
valuable to assess how CEDM can bias the true nature of the benefits of biological cassava productivity 
growth. 
 Due to its simplicity, CEDM is also subject to other restrictive 
assumptions, as discussed in Section 2.  
The results in this work indicate that in the particular case of cassava producers in Benin, CEDM 
may significantly overestimate the aggregate benefit of virus-resistant biological productivity growth, 
while slightly underestimating the benefit for low-income producers who belong to the higher farmgate 
price zones because of their proximity to a major consumption market.
2
The results are obtained by a simulation approach that simultaneously relaxes or replaces the 
aforementioned assumptions and uses empirically estimated parameters, such as supply-and-demand 
elasticities. More specifically, this study modifies CEDM into a model with alternative assumptions 
 The latter finding is also 
important because CEDM can lead to an understatement of pro-poorness of cassava productivity growth 
as supported by several studies. Therefore ignoring biases of restrictive assumptions under CEDM can 
have serious implications for how we evaluate the overall benefit and the pro-poorness of virus-resistant 
cassava in Benin. Thus the use of a more data-intensive, less-restrictive, and realistic, but also labor-
intensive, model, as described in this study, is worthwhile.  
                                                       
1 Another implicit assumption in CEDM is a perfectly inelastic home consumption. The relaxation of the perfectly inelastic 
home consumption assumption, however, has relatively small effects on estimated welfare and is thus excluded from the 
subsequent discussion, although it is included in the actual estimation of alternative EDM. 
2 Although they sell cassava at a higher farmgate price, these producers are still low income because their production costs 
are high and their production is small.   
2 
(called alternative EDM [AEDM])—namely, (1) a supply curve in constant elasticity form; (2) 
productivity growth as expressed by a pivotal shift in supply curve; (3) nonzero market margins with 
structures indicated by Barrett (2008). This study empirically compares CEDM with AEDM, using the 
Benin Small Farmer Dataset collected by IFPRI
3
This study contributes to the literature by improving our understanding of how CEDM with 
restrictive assumptions on transaction costs and biological productivity growth may provide a 
significantly different picture of the total size and pro-poorness of the welfare effects of biological 
productivity growth in SSA countries.  
 (Benin dataset, hereafter). 
 
                                                       
3 A more detailed description of the Benin dataset is given in Takeshima (2008).  
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2.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND APPROACH 
Overview of Conventional EDM versus Alternative EDM 
The EDM, originally developed by Muth (1964), is one method used to evaluate ex ante the economic 
effects of scale-neutral productivity growth (Alston, Norton, and Pardey 1998) and has been applied to 
semisubsistence agriculture (Hayami and Herdt 1977; Norton, Ganoza, and Pomareda 1987; Qaim 1999, 
2001; Andreu et al. 2006). Despite some limitations, EDM is still a powerful tool for measuring the 
aggregate welfare effects of certain population groups when conducting an ex ante welfare-effects 
analysis for GM subsistence cassava.  
The market-clearing conditions for EDM can be expressed as  
    (1) 
    (2) 
  ,  (3) 
in which qs,i is cassava supply by household i; qd is the cassava demand, which is further broken down 
into demand by producers themselves ( ) and demand by the rest of the consumer ( ); and δi 
is the production technology level that affects the marginal cost curve. CEDM assumes p = farmgate sales 
price = consumption price.  
With a productivity growth in CEDM, supply curve qs,i shifts in parallel and vertically down by δi 
,where δi/p = Ki, with Ki defined as percentage reduction in MC relative to the equilibrium price p = p0. 
The welfare effects for producers (∆PW) and consumers (∆CS) are expressed as  
 
    (4) 
    (5) 
  ,  (6) 
in which  is price elasticity of production by producer (or producer groups) i, εd is price elasticity of 
demand (including home consumption), Ki is percentage reduction in production costs, hi is proportion of 
home consumption to production by i, and ssi is the proportion of production by i to total production. 
Total welfare effect (∆Total) is simply 
  .  (7) 
The advantage of CEDM is that given the basic information of productivity growth, welfare gains 
can be easily calculated using formulas (4) through (7). CEDM is, however, subject to assumptions that 
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are questionable in the context of semisubsistence crops. Among those, three assumptions (listed in Table 
1) are discussed in this section.  
Table 1. Underlying assumptions for conventional EDM and alternative EDM 
  CEDM  AEDM 
Supply curve  Linear  Constant elasticity 
Shift in supply curve  Parallel  Pivotal 
Market margin  Zero  Positive 
Source: Author. 
Formula (4) assumes linear supply curves, with productivity growth expressed as a parallel shift 
in the supply curve. Using (4) when the supply elasticity is less than 1 is controversial. Any linear supply 
curve with elasticity less than 1 measured at the initial equilibrium has zero MC for up to some positive 
production quantity. Voon and Edwards (1991) also prefer to use the constant elasticity form with pivotal 
shifts, because it provides more conservative estimates of benefits than the linear form when supply 
elasticity is less than 1, as is the case of this study. AEDM assumes a supply curve in constant elasticity 
form, which avoids the problem of zero MC for positive production quantity. 
AEDM uses a pivotal shift to express productivity growth for several reasons. First, a pivotal shift 
in a constant elasticity supply curve assumes a proportional reduction in MC at each production quantity. 
For biological or yield-increasing productivity growth that does not require additional input, such as GM 
cassava, a proportional reduction in marginal cost may be realistic, because for each unit of output, a 
farmer reduces the input by the same proportion (Lindner and Jarrett 1978; Rose 1980).  
Second, for computation purposes, when we assume different farmgate price levels, assuming the 
same reduction in MC for all producers is questionable. Moreover, it is not feasible to do so in simulation, 
because the reduction in MC can be greater than the initial level of MC for some producers who have 
relatively low MC at the initial equilibrium production level.  
High transaction costs in Africa have been widely reported in the literature, and significant 
margins exist both between the farmgate price and the local consumption market price and among the 
various consumption markets (Barrett 2008). AEDM incorporates positive market margins between the 
farmgate sales price and the consumption market price in a specific way. Although later sections describe 
this issue in more depth, consumption market is defined here as the end market of cassava, as opposed to 
intermediate markets like collection points.
4
Estimates from CEDM are proportional to the initial equilibrium price p0 in formulas (4) through 
(6). Because plant breeding research is often justified based on the total benefit, the level of p0 is critical 
in estimating welfare effects using EDM. Literature using CEDM generally uses farmgate prices reported 
by secondary sources like the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) or local governments as p0 
(Qaim 1999, 2001) or the average of the reported farmgate and wholesale prices (Andreu et al. 2006). The 
 One way to incorporate market margins so they reflect either 
the difference between farmgate price and end-market price or the difference among end-market prices in 
different regions is to keep those market margins constant and exogenous to productivity growth (Alston, 
Norton, and Pardey 1998), as is employed in the AEDM, as described in later sections.  
                                                       
4 The terms consumption market and collection point are both used in the Benin dataset. Although the Benin dataset does not 
provide the definitions of these terms, collection point is often used to refer to a place where cassava sellers bring their cassava to 
traders, who then transport the cassava to the consumption market. I distinguish between consumption market and collection 
point as follows: In the consumption market, cassava reaches consumers. From the consumer welfare perspective, the price of 
cassava in the consumption market is more important than the price in collection points. Therefore in the EDM, I focus on the 
estimated price at the consumption market, not at the collection point, to calibrate the demand curve that represents the aggregate 
marginal utility of cassava consumption in Benin. 
Collection point is still important, however, when I estimate the farmgate sales price of some cassava producers who report 
only the price at the collection point. Prices received at this collection point should include some margin in addition to the 
farmgate price. This margin is similar to the margin between the farmgate price and the price at the consumption market.  
5 
information of p0 is, however, less accurate or simply unavailable for some developing countries and 
commodities.
5
Another important property of CEDM, particularly embedded in formulas (4) through (6), is that 
when Ki is the same for all i, εd < 0 and εsi > 0; at this point, CEDM tends to estimate more positive ∆PWi 
for producers with larger production qsi.
 For example, the estimation of p0 for cassava is particularly difficult, because cassava is 
rarely traded outside the country and no border price exists as it does for crops like maize. The definition 
of p0 is also vague when there are different price levels. Later sections describe how this study defines 
and estimates a price equivalent to p0. 
6
The Representation of Cassava Market with Double-Buffer Concept in Barrett (2008)    
 As shown in the simulation, AEDM may be less affected by the 
restrictions mentioned here, though it may be rather difficult to generalize the results. 
Market margin, which primarily comprises transportation costs, is relatively high in SSA countries, and 
individual, as well as aggregate, supply and demand can be significantly different from those countries 
under no market margin. This section first describes the supply-and-demand schedules for 
semisubsistence farmers facing high-market margins between farmgate and consumption market, 
following Minot (1999), and explains how welfare effects are measured.  
This section then describes how the market for nontraded crops like cassava is cleared when the 
difference in equilibrium prices among multiple consumption markets is largely determined by the 
intermarket margins. More specifically, this section describes how cassava prices vary across different 
consumption markets inside Benin and how the price difference can be treated exogenous to cassava 
productivity growth. Figure 1 illustrates a market structure behind the double buffering in Barrett (2008). 
Cassava is traded through two layers of channels—one channel between each cassava producer and the 
local consumption market and the other between different consumption markets. Barrett (2008) 
distinguishes the relationship between semisubsistence farmers and local markets from the relationship 
between semisubsistence local markets and other markets.
                                                       
5 For example, the FAO does not provide producer prices for cassava for Benin but does for Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, 
and Togo. 
6 See Appendix B.  
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The Effect of Market Margin between Farmgate and Consumption Markets 
In the presence of a nonzero market margin between farmgate price and the price at the consumption 





there is one cassava producing-household i and a large market in which a large quantity of cassava is 
traded at price (Figure 2) (which is the equivalent of  in Figure 1, as discussed at the beginning 
of Section 2). For household i, the total cost (including opportunity cost of input factors) of producing qp 
units of cassava $C(qp) includes the opportunity cost of time required for planting seeds and weeding and 
the opportunity cost of land required. Because land is scarce and labor is often limited (especially if there 
is a failure in the labor market) for many cassava-producing households, we assume that ∂C(qp)/ ∂qp is 
strictly increasing in qp.
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Figure 2. Assumed relationships between a cassava-producing household and the market 
Source: 
Author. 
Household i derives utility U(qC) from consuming qC units of cassava. The household consumes 
cassava as food, gifts for the family, or in-kind payment for labor. We assume that the marginal utility of 
cassava consumption is strictly decreasing in qC. 
With given C(qp) and U(qc), household i can decide either to sell or buy some cassava at the 
market or not to trade cassava at all, depending on and the per-unit transport cost. If the per-unit 
transport cost is τi, then the farmgate sales price  for i is =  – . Similarly, the farmgate 
purchase price for i is   =  + . The relationship between and   is thus =   – 2
.  
The household supply-and-demand curves for cassava are similar to market supply-and-demand 
curves, except, as in Minot (1999), the supply and demand of cassava become perfectly inelastic when the 
market price is in a band with width 2  (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Production and home consumption curves for subsistence cassava-producing household 
 
Source: Author.   
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With a productivity growth, the marginal cost curve shifts out, which then shift production and 
home consumption curves. How production and home consumption curves shift, however, also depend on 
the market margins. The production and home consumption curves under new production technologies 
are derived as in Figure 4.   
Figure 4. Productivity growth and shifts in production and demand curve 
 
Source: Author. 
The simulation presented in later sections calibrates the model for individual observations in the 
Benin dataset and is thus more disaggregated than some other studies that apply EDM. This study argues 
the benefit of disaggregating EDM on the following counts, even though aggregated EDM in the previous 
literature has required less information and may be more robust to the violation of assumptions employed 
in disaggregated EDM.  
Aggregated supply-and-demand curves could be illustrated as in Figure 3, which is actually used 
for individual cassava producers, with a good approximation of market margin τ for the entire market. 
This paper, however, argues that Figure 3 is not a good representation of aggregated supply and demand. 
For example, Figure 3, if used for aggregate market, implies perfectly inelastic aggregate supply and 
demand when price is in a certain range, which not only is too restrictive but also requires the assumption 
that all producers face the same per-unit transaction costs. In addition, the Benin data suggest significant 
variations in price received by each cassava producer or heterogeneity in the characteristics of producers. 
Supply-and-demand curves for a semisubsistence cassava producer in Figure 3 can thus be linked to the 
average consumption price P (or its solution
∗
P ˆ ), as in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5. Relevant price for semisubsistence cassava producers i facing two transportation costs 
  
Source: Author. 
Having derived the supply and home consumption curves, we now define the welfare for the 
cassava-producing households. The welfare measurement in this study is similar to the concept of the 
Marshallian surplus.
8
  ,  (8) 
 Let us define Q* as Q* = max[Q
P, Q
C], in which Q
P and Q
C denote quantity 
produced and quantity consumed, respectively. More specifically, Q* = Q
P for a cassava-selling 
household, Q* = Q
C for a cassava-purchasing household, and Q* = Q
P = Q
C for an autarkic household. 
With Q*, the welfare for a cassava-producing household i (Wi) can be expressed as 
in which MU and MC are marginal utility curve and marginal cost curve, respectively.    
The expression max[MU(q),  – ] – min[MC(q),  + ] measures the maximum 
possible net benefit a cassava producer can derive from the qth unit of cassava at hand. Because a cassava 
producer has Q* of cassava from which he can derive net benefit, his total welfare can be measured by 
integrating max[MU(q),  – ] – min[MC(q),  + ] up to Q*.  
 
                                                       
8 The benefit of using the Marshallian demand curve instead of the Hicksian demand curve is that the former can be 
estimated with less information, like income elasticity, than can the Hicksian demand curve (Alston, Norton, and Pardey, 1998). 
The welfare effects using the Marshallian demand curve are biased, because it ignores the income effect caused by cassava 
productivity growth. However, Alston and Larson (1993) argue that bias may be larger from using Hicksian demand curve if 
Hicksian demand curve is recovered using empirically estimated elasticities which often contain errors. That is why this study 
continues using the Marshallian demand curve to conduct EDM, even though the estimation of demand curves in the previous 
section includes the income effects as well. 
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The Effect of Market Margins between Consumption Markets: Application of Double Buffering 
(Barrett 2008) and Required Assumptions 
Applying Barrett’s (2008) argument, the price of the commodity in each nonautarkic market j differs from 
the prices in other markets by the difference in the margin between each market j and the border price, or 
the international price. The “geographic specificity” of price (Barrett 2008) has been observed for many 
commodities in Africa and appears consistent with the Benin dataset. It therefore seems appropriate to 
employ assumption (9) in the EDM:  
Assumption: Price differences across different consumption markets are exogenously 
fixed to the GM cassava introduction in ex ante welfare effects estimation 
using EDM.
9
Assumption (9) relates to the theory of market integration, widely studied in the literature, 
regarding the efficiency of intermarket price transmissions. This assumption is generally supported for 
West African countries, including Benin (Kuiper, Lutz, and Tilburg 1999; Badiane and Shively 1998). 
   (9) 
Several questions, however, remain regarding how restrictive (9) is. First, it is unclear 
whether the argument by Barrett (2008) holds for cassava, because this crop is generally not 
traded internationally and no border price exists for cassava. Second, it remains to be seen how 
assumption (9) facilitates the inclusion of market margins to EDM with certain limitations 
associated with the Benin dataset, even though the assumption requires that no local market j is 
autarkic.  
For commodities traded internationally, their prices in each market (either consumption 
market or collection point) inside the country can be expressed as 
autarkic   is     if; ,
market     exporting an    is     if; , ) , ( ˆ
market   importing an    is     if; , ) , ( ˆ
, j p p
j Q G p p





















cb is the border price, or the price at the international market;  is market-specific transaction 
costs; G is “the state of public goods and services (e.g., communication and transport infrastructure, 
property rights, and so on)” (Barrett 2008, p. 302); Q is “the aggregate throughput in the local market” 
(Barrett 2008, p. 302); and  is “the local market price that equates local market demand […] with 
local market supply” (Barrett 2008, p. 302).
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Assumption (9) requires that relationships similar to (10) hold for cassava, which is not traded 
internationally, has no border price, and for which no consumption market is autarkic. First we define the 
weighted average consumption price of cassava (fresh-tuber equivalent)   equivalent to p
cb for cassava 
as 
 
  ,  (11) 
 
                                                       
9 Assumption (9) is expressed as a sentence, instead of in mathematical form, because it introduces a set of assumptions 
discussed below, and it is rather difficult to be expressed mathematically in a concise form. 

























in which  is the fresh-tuber equivalent quantity of cassava consumed in consumption market j. As is 
clear from (11),   is the weighted average consumption price of cassava with share of  to the total 
consumption ( ) used as weights. We then define the relationship between and as 
  ,  (12) 
in which  measures the difference between  and
 
.  is the counterpart of   in (10), 
except the former can be both positive and negative, because it is unclear whether consumption market j 
is an exporting or importing market.   is defined as  
  ,  (13) 
in which  and  are production and home consumption by producer i, respectively, and  is the 
net trade between consumption market j and k for all k ≠ j.  must satisfy the following conditions: 
.  (14) 
In other words, cassava is traded only from a lower-price consumption market to a higher-price 
consumption market.  
The second requirement in (9) is that no consumption market or group of consumption markets is 
autarkic. In other words, every consumption market j must trade cassava with at least one other 
consumption market, and every subgroup of consumption markets must trade cassava with at least one 
other subgroup of consumption markets. Figure 6 presents some of the examples that satisfy or violate the 
requirement.  
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Summary Specification of Alternative EDM (AEDM) 
In summary, AEDM can be defined as the counterpart of (1) through (3). The previous discussion of 
different consumption market prices can be extended to the case in which each observation in the Benin 
dataset trades cassava at its corresponding consumption market.
11
With price and  as defined in (22) and (23), respectively, satisfies the following 
market-clearing condition:  
 Therefore, from this point on, we 
replace notation j, used to indicate consumption market in the previous sections, with i, which indicates 
each household observation.  
  ,  (15) 
where and are cassava production and home consumption curves, respectively. The cassava 
price at the nearest consumption market and the per-unit transaction costs to transport cassava from the 
farm to the consumption market are as defined above. More explicitly,  
,  (16) 
in which  s
i α ö and  h
i α ö are individual specific scalars for production and home consumption, Ai is the 
adoption rate of a new GM variety among producer group i, and ∆Yi is the yield growth expressed as the 
horizontal shift in supply curve. In the context of a structure as shown in (10),  should, in theory, be 
determined through condition (17). In this study, however, (17) is simplified as (17'): 
,  (17) 
  .  (17') 
Condition (17) is similar to the supply-and-demand curves for individual producers. Condition 
(17'), on the other hand, states that the initial difference between and  for each i (=  ) is set 
constant in the simulation, because the consumption volume in each market i is unavailable. In other 
words, we assume that if consumption market i is a net exporter of cassava, then it remains a net exporter 
throughout the entire period, and vice versa. This assumption is required so that the simulation reflects the 
regional differences in cassava price in a way that is consistent with the dataset, which is why this study 
employs (17') instead of (17). The difference between AEDM and CEDM is illustrated in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7. CEDM (left) and AEDM (right)
a 
 
Source: Author.  
Note:
 aAll notations are from (15) and (16), except  2 1 H H H + = ,  2 1 S S S + = . H′ and S′are counterparts of H and S, in which H and S are those before the GM-led 
productivity growth, while H′ and S′are those after the GM-led productivity growth. Similarly, 
′
P ˆ is the counterpart of P ˆ after productivity growth.D ˆ is the aggregate 
consumption by noncassava producers.  
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In addition, condition (15) needs slight modification in the simulation. We modify (15) as 
follows: 
  ,  (18) 
in which we use the aggregate demand function D(P) instead of , because the 
information is only available for aggregate cassava consumption by nonproducers.
12
Welfare for a cassava-producing household i (Wi) that is expressed as (8) can be measured for 
both with and without GM cassava. To express the measurement of welfare gains, we first define Wi for 
“with GM” cassava ( ) and “without GM” cassava ( ). For convenience, we expand the 
notation for  ,  , and  , which change between “with GM” cassava and “without GM” 
cassava, to  ,  , and  for “with GM cassava” and  ,  , 
and  for “without GM” cassava.   and   are then  
  
    (8') 
   (8") 
The welfare effect for producer group i (∆PWi) for AEDM is therefore  
    (19) 
The welfare effects for consumers, or noncassava producers, (∆CS) in AEDM is  
  ,  (20) 
in which the notation for price P as defined in (11) is expanded to   and  . 
As summarized in Table 2, AEDM consists of individual supply and home consumption 
schedules (equations [16] and [17']) and market-clearing conditions (18). Welfare measurements ∆PW 
and ∆CS in AEDM are generally expressed as (19) and (20). 
                                                       
12 This requires certain assumptions regarding the shape of  ( )
CM
i i P D τˆ ˆ − , which is the demand curve for each consumption 
market. For example, if we assume the aggregate demand curve D(P) to have constant elasticity of demand such that D(P) = AP
η, 
with η as demand elasticity, then Di may not be exactly in constant elasticity form. More precisely, we may have  
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η η τ τ ) ( . 
Therefore the assumption of D(P) = AP
η requires that not all Di’s have constant elasticity form. The literature, however, uses 
constant elasticity forms, as well as linear forms, for aggregate demand curve, often with little theoretical reasoning. This study 
therefore regards (18) to be appropriate.  
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) 0 ˆ , ˆ ˆ ˆ , ˆ ˆ = − − − − ∑ P D P H P S
I
i
i i i i i i
CM CM τ τ τ τ
( ) ∑ −
i i i
CM P D τˆ ˆ
GM




i p ) (q MC
GM , ∗
i Q GM CM,
i p ) ( GM q MC GM   No , ∗
i Q GM   No CM,
i p
) ( GM   No q MC GM
i W GM   No
i W
{ } dq p q MC p q MU W
i Q
i i i i i ∫
∗
+ − − =
GM ,
0
GM CM, GM GM CM, GM ] ˆ ), ( min[ ] ˆ ), ( max[ τ τ
{ } dq p q MC p q MU W
i Q
i i i i i ∫
∗
+ − − =
GM   No   ,
0
GM   No   CM, GM   No GM   No   CM, GM   No ] ˆ ), ( min[ ] ˆ ), ( max[ τ τ
GM   No GM
i i i W W PS − = ∆









GM   No ˆ P
GM ˆ P 
15 
Table 2. Structure of the model 
Conditions  Equation 
Individual supply and home consumption schedule  (16), (17') 
Market-clearing condition  (18) 




3.  EMPIRICAL APPLICATION AND MODEL COMPARISON 
We now conduct a welfare effects estimation using both CEDM and AEDM for hypothetical introduction 
of GM cassava in Benin. We then examine how the two EDMs provide different estimates of welfare 
effects and determine whether the two EDMs indicate differently how the welfare gains are distributed 
across cassava producers with different income levels.  
Before going into the technical details, Table 3 summarizes the Benin cassava market structure 
inferred from the Benin dataset and the annual population growth rate in 1997 (see Appendix B for 
detailed definitions). Cassava-producing households accounted for 45 percent of the total population in 
Benin in 1997. On average, producers consume 20 percent of their produce and sell the rest to market.  
Table 3. Structure of Benin cassava market 
    On-farm type  Off-farm type  Nonproducers 
Production (t)    424,519  423,028   
Consumption (t)    77,524  100,555  669,468 
% of subsistence consumption    18  24   
Population growth rate (%)    2.5  2.5  2.5 
Estimated population (million)    2.75  3.34 
Sources: Production, consumption, and percentage of subsistence consumption are calculated by the author from IFPRI 2004. 
The estimation population and population growth rate are from FAO 2006.  
Structure and Calibration of the Models 
This section describes how the study uses the Benin dataset to calibrate the parameters introduced in the 
conceptual framework above. The description here is for the AEDM in Table 4. This section also briefly 
summarizes an additional model that is included due to reasons explained later.  
Table 4. Models used in welfare effects estimation 
  Market margin  Linear or constant elasticity  Shifts in supply curve 
CEDM  No  Linear  Parallel 
Other Model  No  Constant elasticity  Pivotal 
AEDM  Yes  Constant elasticity  Pivotal 
Source: Author. 
The structural parameters used in the AEDM are listed in Table 5. Some of these parameters are 
estimated from the dataset, whereas others are calculated as described below, using specific assumptions 
in manners consistent with the discussions in Section 2.    
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Table 5. Important variables estimated (calibrated) from the dataset 
  Definition  Variables used 
 to calculate  
Formula 
 
Farmgate sales price    Regression (25), (27) 
 
Market margin (for individual 
producers)    Regression (26), (28) 
  Price at local consumption market  ,    (29) 
  Average consumption price  ,   (22) 
 
Market margin (between local 
consumption markets)  ,   (12) 
 
Elasticity of production    Regression (Takeshima 2008) 
 
Elasticity of home consumption    Regression (Takeshima 2008) 
 
Elasticity of demand    Regression (Takeshima 2008) 
  Production curve  (16)   
  Home consumption curve  (16)   
Source: Author. 
In calculating from (11) using the Benin dataset, this study assumes that can be 
approximated as  
    (21) 
in which and are production and home consumption quantities reported by producer i, respectively, 
and is the sample weight for observation i in the Benin dataset. In other words, 
 
is the 
total net sales of cassava supplied to local consumption market i sold by producers represented by 
observation i.  
Equation (21) assumes that almost all cassava consumed in consumption market i is provided by 
the local cassava farmers who sell cassava to market i and that a relatively small quantity of cassava is 
transported between different consumption markets. As was mentioned earlier, each observation i 
represents the group of similar producers who all sell cassava to the same consumption market i.  is 
therefore approximated to in the simulation as 
    (22) 
in which  is estimated from the dataset (discussed in equation [29]). From (12) and (22), we know 
that 
    (23) 
The assumption behind (22) is that interregional trade is small relative to the consumption 
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evidence, some studies indicate that the quantity of cassava traded interregionally is small relative to total 
production (Gabre-Madhin et al. 2001).  
Section 2 discussed how the choice of p is important in CEDM and that Qaim (1999, 2001) used 
farmgate price for this value. In this simulation, because the representative farmgate price is unavailable, 
p is defined as the weighted average of farmgate price   estimated for each i, with weights as fresh-
tuber equivalent production by i. More explicitly,  
  .  (24) 
The Benin dataset contains the  of cassava for only on-farm sellers, and  for only off-farm 
sellers. This study follows Vakis, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2003) to predict and  for all cassava 
producers, including autarkic producers, in the dataset. More specifically, we first run regressions  
    (25) 
    (26) 
in which and are exogenous factors assumed to affect and , respectively. We then obtain the 
predicted values of  ,  , and as 
  ( ) ≠ ∀ = i x p pf pf
i
f
i , ˆ exp ˆ β on-farm sellers  (27) 
  ( ) ≠ ∀ = i xi i , ˆ exp ˆ τ τ β τ off-farm sellers  (28) 
  ,  (29) 
in which (29) indicates the assumption that for every producer group i, there is a consumption market i 
that is an end market for cassava, and the price at consumption market i ( ) also satisfies condition 
(12). (See Appendix B for the detailed results for [25] through [29].)  
Using (29) and formula (22), we calculate , or the price that satisfies the market-clearing 
conditions in the AEDM in (18). Although  Salesi = 0 for i = autarkic producers,   is still 
defined for such markets in (29).
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13 Extending the assumption in Section 2, for i = autarkic producers, Di ≠ 0, so that 
  is then obtained as the difference between and  for each i 
and is kept constant before and after productivity growth. 
CM
i p ˆ is set by the transportation costs 
between other consumption markets, but Di is small enough that price  CM























i p i τ
f
i p ˆ i τˆ







( ) sellers   farm   off   , ln = ∀ + = i u x i i i





i p i τ
f














i p ˆ P ˆ 
19 
CEDM generally uses the reported farmgate price as p in the model. In this study, by using 
formula (24) and  as estimated above, the weighted average farmgate price is calculated and 
inserted into p in formulas (4) through (7).  
Supply and consumption curves (Si and Hi, respectively, in [16]) can be calibrated using ; 
production and consumption elasticities ( , ) as estimated in Takeshima (2008), which are shown in 
Table 6 (see Appendix B for detailed definitions); reported production ( ); and home consumption 
quantity ( ). Calibration for autarkic producers is more complicated. As illustrated in Figure 8, given
, ,   (= ), and , Si and Hi can be any of (a) through (c). Whether each autarkic producer has 
supply and home consumption curves like (a), (b), or (c) affects how productivity growth through GM 
cassava leads to a change in aggregate supply throughout the entire market and P; thus the welfare effects 
estimation.  
Table 6. Important variables estimated (calibrated) from the dataset
a  




    Regression (26) 
δ (in equation [30])  U [0, 2]   
  N




−(−.89, .19)  N
− (−.39, .25) 
  U[-.91, -.46]    Deaton (1988), Tsegai and Kormawa (2002) 
(% adoption rate) 
100   
Shifts in supply curve 
Shifts out horizontally by 30% (scenario 1) 
Shifts down vertically by 30% (scenario 2)   
Source: Author.  
Note:
 aN: Normal distribution, N
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Figure 8. Calibration of supply-and-demand curves for autarkic producers 
 
Source: Author. 
Due to a lack of information, this study assumes  
  ,   for i = autarkic,  (30) 
in which δ ~ U [0, 2], which is one of the stochastic parameters included in the simulation (see Table 6). 
To be more precise, δ = 1 in Figure 8b, δ = 0.5 in Figure 8a, and δ = 1.5 in Figure 8c. With δ ~ U [0, 2], 
we assume MC and MU for autarkic producers such that C is uniformly distributed in A and B. 
Alternative methods are available but have little practicality.
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  In addition to CEDM and AEDM, one additional model (called Other Model hereafter) is 
estimated. Three models are therefore compared, as characterized in Table 4. The differences between 
each model are the shape of the supply curve, how the supply curve shifts, and whether the model 
includes nonzero market margin.  
 
  Other Model is included so that the quantitative difference between estimates from CEDM and 
AEDM can be more easily understood. For example, the total gains from AEDM are expected to be much 
smaller than those from CEDM. This is not only because of market margins but also because AEDM uses 
pivotal shift, whereas CEDM uses parallel shifts in the supply curve; switching from parallel shift to 
pivotal shift often reduces the estimated total welfare gains (Alston, Norton, and Pardey 1998). Therefore 
if the focus is on the inclusion of market margins, then the comparison of Other Model with AEDM may 
be more informative than the comparison of conventional EDM with AEDM.  
Comparisons of AEDM and Other Model may provide some picture of how relaxing assumptions 
on market margin and home consumption curves alter the estimation results. However, this study does not 
                                                       
14 For example, it is possible to predict s
i α ˆ and  h
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examine in detail the difference between the two models, because Other Model is rarely used in the 
literature. In addition, Other Model is not preferred over AEDM, because of the former’s restrictive 
assumptions about zero market margins or home consumption curves. In addition, findings from 
comparing AEDM with Other Model are only empirical and cannot be easily generalized, because the 
differences depend on many other structural parameters used in the model. 
Other Model is similar to CEDM and begins with conditions (1) through (3), with p = 
(weighted average of farmgate sales price) as obtained in (24). The only difference between Other Model 
and CEDM is that for the latter both qs,i and qd are in constant elasticity forms, whereas for Other Model,  
  .  (2') 
The differences between CEDM and AEDM may lead to different implications for the pro-
poorness of GM cassava. How these two models differ can be partly inferred from the characteristics of 
cassava producers. Some insights are gained by analyzing formulas (4) through (7) for ∆PW, combined 
with how relevant characteristics of cassava producers vary across different income levels.  
Figures 9 through 12 show the most salient characteristics of cassava producers across different 
income levels. Figure 9 shows the proportion of the population that belongs to a cassava-producing 
household with a particular income range. Figures 10 through 12 plot the median of farmgate prices 
(estimated for some groups of producers using regressions [25] and [27]), per capita annual cassava 
production, and per capita daily cassava consumption against per capita income levels. Ignoring all the 
intrahousehold income allocations, Figure 9 indicates that almost half of the cassava-producing 
households earned less than US$100 per capita; 75 percent earned less than $200 in 1997
15
 
. Figures 10 
through 12 suggest that lower-income cassava producers tend to produce and consume less and face 
higher farmgate prices.  
                                                       















Source: IFPRI (2004) 
 
Figure 10. Median of estimated farmgate 




Source: IFPRI (2004) and Author. 
 
                                                       
16 Proportion is calculated using number of 
observations (household) * household size * survey 
weights for each observation. 
Figure 11. Production (ton/per capita, year) 
by income level
  
Source: IFPRI (2004) and Author. 
 
Figure 12. Home consumption (kilogram/per 
capita, day) by income level
  
Source: IFPRI (2004) and Author. 
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Section 2 indicated that ∆PW in CEDM tends to be more positive for cassava producers who have 
a larger quantity of production and home consumption. In addition, because CEDM assumes only one 
price, and ∆PW in CEDM uses the relative change in equilibrium price dp/p for all types of producers, 
CEDM may overstate dp/p for cassava producers who have a relatively higher farmgate price when dp is 
the same for all producers. Thus CEDM may underestimate the welfare gains for producers who have 
higher farmgate prices
17
Just because lower-income cassava producers tend to produce and consume less and face higher 
farmgate prices does not necessarily indicate the differences between AEDM and CEDM, because AEDM 
includes additional structural parameters not present in CEDM. The characteristics of lower-income 
cassava producers, however, do indicate that although AEDM is likely to lead to less positive welfare 
gains for most cassava producers than is CEDM, the former may lead to more positive welfare gains for 
lower cassava producers than would CEDM.  
. 
Estimation of Welfare Effects and Approach for Comparing CEDM and AEDM 
Many recent studies using EDM deal with the uncertainty in market structures, such as supply-and-
demand elasticities, by adding idiosyncratic errors to some of the structural parameters. The then analyze 
the sensitivity of estimates of the change in structural parameters (Davis and Espinoza 1998; Zhao et al. 
2000). Although the choice of error terms can be arbitrary, a common approach is to use the standard 
deviation associated with parameters estimated in previous studies. This study, using the regression 
results from Takeshima (2008) and regressions (25) and (26), assigns the distributions for some 
parameters in Table 6. We have run 1,000 simulations, each of which uses different combinations of 
parameters drawn from the distributions specified in Table 6. The simulation results are then presented as 
the range, rather than the point estimates.  
This study does not explicitly model the adoption rates over time, as has been done in the 
literature. Instead this study assumes, for the following reasons, that all cassava producers will adopt a 
new GM variety after a certain period . First, the purpose of this study is to compare the estimates from 
conventional EDM with those from AEDM. Thus, including an adoption trend may add more uncertainty 
to each model, making it more difficult to interpret the difference between conventional EDM and 
AEDM. Second, GM cassava is expected to be distributed to producers at a significantly low price. 
Adoption rates for GM cassava can therefore eventually reach 100 percent. 
Expected percentage growth of yield (y) depends on many factors. The development of GM 
cassava for Benin seems to be lagging behind some other African countries whose data are not available. 
Furthermore, how the cassava yield will be affected depends on the particular varieties of cassava 
introduced in the future.  
Studies of cassava in other African countries provide some insights into the expected yield 
growth of several varieties of cassava (30 percent for virus-resistant cassava in Uganda,
18
                                                       
17 As mentioned in Section 2, AEDM follows Alston, Norton, and Pardey (1998) and treats market margins between 
consumption markets and farmgate price as exogenous and constant ((9)) Assumption (9) therefore assumes that the change in 
farmgate sales price is the same for the entire cassava producer group i. In AEDM, the similar value for dp/p is smaller for 
producers who have a higher farmgate price (dp is negative, because productivity growth lowers the price). On the other hand, 
AEDM also follows the suggestions of Lindner and Jarrett (1978) and assumes that GM cassava lowers the marginal cost for all 
cassava producers by the same proportion. This assumption means that cassava producers with a higher farmgate price 
experience a larger reduction in marginal cost, so that Ki is the same for all producers. Then dp/p + Ki when AEDM is more 
positive for producers with a higher farmgate price; thus assuming the same dp/p as in CEDM will underestimate dp/p + Ki.  
 while loss due 
to virus is up to 60 percent in Ghana [Horna, Smale, and Falck-Zepeda 2007]). Assuming that the average 
loss in cassava yield in Ghana is 30 percent (which is the midpoint of 0 percent and 60 percent), a similar 
yield growth for a virus-resistant variety of cassava in Benin should be around 30 percent.  
 From CEDM formula (4), we can see that the larger dp/p + Ki leads to more positive ∆PW (see Appendix A).  
18 Based on conversations at the Donald Danforth Center in Saint Louis, which spearheads the research in the development 
of GM cassava.   
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Complications arise when information about a new GM variety is given in terms of cost reduction 
instead of yield growth, because a 30 percent cost reduction is not necessarily a 30 percent yield growth, 
unless the supply elasticity is 1. AEDM therefore uses two scenarios: (1) 30 percent yield growth for all 
producers, or (2) 30 percent reduction in MC relative to the initial farmgate sales price. For (1), the supply 
curve is shifted out by 30 percent horizontally, whereas for (2) the supply curve is shifted down by 30 
percent vertically. Because the elasticity of supply is less than 1, the supply curve shifts down by more 
than 30 percent in case (1) and shifts out less than 30 percent in case (2).
19
This study thus considers two scenarios. Scenario 1 assumes yi = 0.3 (30 percent increase in 
yield); scenario 2 assumes ki = 0.3, as shown in Table 6, in which ki is the percentage reduction in 
marginal cost at the initial equilibrium production quantity. The underlying assumptions for both 
scenarios are the following: In scenario 1, producers with a less elastic supply curve experience a larger 
proportional reduction in MC. In scenario 2, producers with a less elastic supply curve experience a 
smaller yield growth.  
 
Benin’s population growth rate is around 2.5 percent. Therefore this study shifts out the demand 
curve horizontally by 2.5 percent from the initial demand curve, as suggested by Norton, Ganoza, and 
Pomareda (1987). Using a 100 percent adoption rate and shifting the demand curve by 2.5 percent mean 
that the estimated welfare gains assume that all cassava producers will adopt GM cassava after one year. 
This assumption may be unrealistic, however, so it might be wise to use the population level in 10 years 
as it would be possible to reach 100 percent adoption by then. However, explicitly assuming when 100 
percent is reached does not make the model more realistic for several reasons. First, it is unclear how 
population growth can lead to a shift in the demand curve. Second, many studies apply rather arbitrary 
discount factors for welfare gains in the future. From these perspectives, assuming a 100 percent adoption 
rate in one year may not be so problematic, particularly where the comparison of CEDM with AEDM is 
concerned.  
CEDM and AEDM are then compared to assess how the estimates from CEDM deviate from 
AEDM, how significant the bias is given the accuracy of parameters used to calibrate both models, and 
how the magnitude and direction of bias vary for households with different income levels to see the 
difference in implications for pro-poorness suggested by the two models. The simulation is programmed 
using statistical software R version 2.7.0, an open-source software developed by R Development Core 
Team.  
 
                                                       
19 At the median, the supply curve shifts down by 50 percent in scenario 1 and shifts out by around 15 percent in scenario 2.   
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4.  RESULTS AND INTERPRETATIONS 
The results of interest are summarized in Tables 7 through 9 and in Figure 13. Tables 7 and 8 show the 
percentage of estimated welfare effects from CEDM and AEDM for scenarios 1 and 2. For example, 
Table 7 says that the total welfare effects (∆Total) estimated by AEDM are above $13.9 million for 50 
percent of the time; and between $9.5 million and $27.3 million for 95 percent of the time. Tables 7 and 8 
indicate the following: (1) Consumer welfare effects that were estimated using CEDM ( ) are more 
positive than those estimated using AEDM ( ); (2) total welfare effects that were estimated using 
CEDM (∆TotalC) are generally more positive than those estimated using AEDM (∆TotalA); (3) 
determining whether producer welfare effects estimated using CEDM ( ) are more positive or 
more negative than those estimated using AEDM ( ) is less obvious, and the intervals for both 
and   are large relative to the median of   and   (high coefficient of 
variations).  
Table 7. Scenario 1 (million US$) 
Percentile  2.5%  50%  97.5%  % change in price 
    ∆Total     
CEDM  17.3  31.5  58.1  –50.6 
Other Model  7.4  9.5  12.3  –23.6 
AEDM  9.5  13.9  27.3  –12.3 
    ∆CS     
CEDM  8.7  22.3  49.5   
Other Model  7.0  9.8  14.0   
AEDM  3.1  6.2  11.3   
    ∆PW     
CEDM  4.8  10.0  15.2   
Other Model  –3.9  -0.2  1.4   
AEDM  1.8  7.5  20.5   
Source: Author.  
Note: *US$1 = 588 FCFA (Franc Communauté Financière Africaine) on July 1997.  
Table 8. Scenario 2 (million US$) 
Percentile  2.5%  50%  97.5%  % change in price 
    ∆Total     
CEDM  13.3  16.3  20.0  –27.5 
Other Model  2.4  4.6  8.2  –12.4 
AEDM  3.3  7.8  16.9  –6.4 
    ∆CS     
CEDM  8.0  10.9  16.9   
Other Model  2.3  4.7  8.3   
AEDM  0.7  2.9  5.9   
    ∆PW     
CEDM  0.5  5.0  8.4   
Other Model  –1.4  –0.2  0.7   
AEDM  0.5  4.5  12.3   
Source: Author. 
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 Prob (∆TotalC > ∆TotalA)  100%  99% 
   72%  55% 
  100%  100% 
Source: Author. 
Figure 13. Comparison of  and for each Θ =   (lines in the figure are the 
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At the median (50 percent) of the estimates, the bias for ∆TotalC is roughly  
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Because Benin’s GDP in 1998 was approximately $2 billion (World Bank), the difference in 
∆TotalC and ∆TotalA is roughly 1.6 percent or 0.7 percent of GDP for scenario 1 and 0.8 percent or 0.4 
percent of GDP for scenario 2, which can be substantial. The results indicate that at the median level, the 
difference between conventional EDM and AEDM can be significantly large and may lead to serious 
policy implications. 
The results in Tables 7 and 8 indicate how the estimated welfare effects can drop from CEDM to 
Other Model. The reason for the much lower estimate from Other Model compared with CEDM is mainly 
that Other Model assumes pivotal shift in the linear supply curve while CEDM assumes parallel shift. 
Although the estimate from Other Model is not directly comparable with that from AEDM, they both 
indicate that the important result for AEDM is a relatively high ∆PW compared with ∆Total and ∆CS
20
The inference made at the median, however, is based on only one of the many possible estimates. 
In connection to the empirical estimation methods, the inference based on the intervals is more 
informative, particularly for  and  , whose coefficient of variation seems high. The focus 
thus shifts to how the estimates from CEDM differ from those from AEDM given each combination of 
structural parameters. We first define a variable, 
, in which
= ( , , , ) and   = ( , , , δ) as in Table 6, and   and   
are the general notation for the welfare effects (total, producer, consumers) estimated using CEDM 
(which is a function of  alone) and AEDM (which is a function of  and  ), respectively. 
. 
One reason for the relatively high ∆PW is that given the same level of yield growth or proportional 
reduction in marginal cost at the initial equilibrium, the drop in price is relatively smaller in AEDM.  
Table 9 shows the probability of  , or the probability that 
 from the simulation. For more than 99 percent of the time, ∆TotalC > ∆TotalA in 
both scenarios 1 and 2. ∆TotalC may be larger than ∆TotalA in part because, as was mentioned by Voon 
and Edwards (1991), the constant elasticity form with pivotal shift often leads to more conservative 
estimates than are achieved with the linear form, and thus it may be predictable. The particular result 
obtained here is, however, still important, because how ∆Total C compares with ∆TotalA depends on the 
empirically estimated structural parameters and their accuracy. The fact that ∆Total C is larger than 
∆TotalA with such a high probability provides one reason for why policy implications based only on 
CEDM may not be reliable and that a model such as AEDM should thus also be considered.  
As in Table 9, whether ∆PWC is more positive than ∆PWA is unclear. The importance of 
comparison between ∆PWC and ∆PWA instead relates to their estimated intervals, which reflect their 
accuracy given the precisions of estimated structural parameters. Figure 13 shows how each combination 
of structural parameters   and   results in different   and  . Figure 13 
                                                       
20. Other Model is not comparable with AEDM for several reasons, including the issues discussed in Footnote 12. AEDM 
assumes individual demand curves at each consumption market calibrated from respective market price  CM
i P τ − , in which not 
all demand curves have constant elasticity form, as explained in Footnote 32. Other Model, however, implicitly assumes the same 
price for all consumption markets and for farmgate sales price. 
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indicates two important points. First, as is shown by the correlation coefficient,  and   have 
a relatively weak relationship, indicating that   has a relatively low power to approximate  . 
The low correlation coefficient thus implies that the power of CEDM to approximate the welfare gain 
estimates can be easily overwhelmed by the lack of some additional information, such as alternative 
assumptions regarding how the supply curve shifts or whether market margins are zero.  
Second, actual deviations of   from  , which are illustrated by the quantile 
smoothing spline (Koenker, Ng, and Portnoy 1994) in Figure 13, indicate the degree of the gap between 
 and  and the probability of exceeding certain levels of that gap. For example, when 
 is $5 million,  can be estimated to be above $10 million almost 50 percent of the time. 
For Benin cassava-producing households in 1998, $5 million would be roughly 1 percent of their income. 
The $5 million deviation of   from   may have important meaning in Benin, whose 
economy has grown approximately 5 percent a year in recent years. The findings in Figure 13 thus imply 
that  can create bias in estimates, and that this bias can be big enough to influence Benin’s 
agricultural policy.  
Another important question is how lower-income cassava producers benefit relative to higher-
income cassava producers. Figure 14 illustrates the intervals of ∆PW (per capita, year) in different per 
capita annual income levels as estimated from AEDM in scenario 2.
21
                                                       
21 The figure for scenario 1 is similar, except for the overall level of welfare gains; lower-income cassava producers seem to 
gain more than do middle-income cassava producers.  
 Figure 15 plots the 50th percentile 
of ∆PW for producers estimated from the two EDMs to see how each estimate provides different 
implications of how welfare gains are shared across different income levels. 
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Figure 14. Intervals of welfare gains for producers in different income levels (scenario 2) 
 
Source: Author.   
The 50 percent line (solid 
bold line) in Figure 14 is 
equivalent to the solid 
line in scenario 2 of 
Figure 15. The two lines 
appear different because 
different functions are 
used in the software. The 
purpose of Figure 14 is to 
illustrate the interval of 
welfare gains from 
AEDM for different 
income levels, whereas 
Figure 15 compares the 
median of intervals for 
different models.  
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Figure 15. Median welfare effects for producers in different income levels (CEDM and AEDM)
 
Source: Author.
Figures 14 and 15 essentially indicate the following: Lower-income cassava producers (below 
$200) tend to benefit slightly more than do middle-income (above $200) cassava producers (Figure 14). 
In addition, although AEDM generally estimates slightly and insignificantly lower ∆PW for all producers 
than CEDM, AEDM provides estimates of slightly higher ∆PW for low-income producers than does 
CEDM. Slightly higher estimates of ∆PW from CEDM may thus result mainly from the higher-income 
cassava producers (Figure 15). Figure 15 thus indicates that CEDM and AEDM may lead to different 
implications of whether GM cassava in Benin is pro-poor.  
Overall, all the results discussed in Section 4 suggest that CEDM can lead to significantly large 
biases in aggregate welfare gains estimates and the wrong interpretation of the pro-poorness of cassava 
productivity growth as compared with AEDM. Conversely, although AEDM requires more time and 
work, it is much stronger than CEDM in maintaining richness in the heterogeneity across producers, 
which is captured by varying marketing margins, farmgate cassava prices, and initial varying distribution 
of incomes and which reflects such heterogeneity in the estimation of welfare gains and pro-poorness of 
cassava productivity growth.  
 






























5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Productivity growth for cassava can significantly affect the welfare of cassava producers, who make up 
one of the most impoverished groups in the world. The actual welfare gain for cassava producers is, 
however, questionable, because it depends on how much productivity growth can offset the fall in cassava 
prices, which is also brought by productivity growth. Therefore, from the perspective of poverty 
reduction, one of the important research questions is how great a gain in welfare cassava productivity 
growth can bring to cassava producers, particularly lower-income cassava producers.  
Many past studies have conducted ex ante welfare effect estimations for similar subsistence crops 
using CEDM, which employs assumptions that may be unrealistic. Although CEDM has the benefit of 
being simpler than AEDM and can be useful for estimating approximated welfare gains, little has been 
studied on how large the biases hidden in CEDM can be as a consequence of its unrealistic assumptions. 
This study contributes to the literature by providing one empirical example of the aforementioned 
issues. The findings suggest that CEDM, which employs controversial assumptions for subsistence crops 
like cassava, may often provide significantly biased welfare gain estimates given the degree of reliability 
of the parameters that are used for productivity growth for subsistence crops. CEDM may also provide 
incorrect implications about whether such productivity growth is pro-poor. The results and discussions in 
the previous section indicate that the use of AEDM may be recommended over CEDM when there are 
good reasons to believe that the supply curve is in constant elasticity and is inelastic rather than linear, 
and when the nature of technology is better represented by the pivotal shift rather than the parallel shift. 
In addition, the use of AEDM may be recommended over CEDM when the market margins are 
significantly large and consequently there is either a positive or negative relationship between the 
farmgate price of commodity for each producer and each producer’s income level. This is because AEDM 
can better translate such information into an assessment of the pro-poorness of the productivity growth at 
issue.  
Although the properties of both CEDM and AEDM still need to be more fully analyzed, they 
offer two different ways to estimate the welfare effects of many semisubsistence crops with data similar 
to the Benin data. The literature often relies more on CEDM than on AEDM. This study provides an 
empirical example of when it may be important to use AEDM as well as CEDM for more informed 
policymaking about investment in public research on semisubsistence crops as a tool to reduce poverty.     
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APPENDIX A: IMPORTANT PROPERTIES OF CONVENTIONAL EDM 
We first start with formula (6). When Ki = K for all producer groups, formula (6) can be modified as 
  .  (6') 
When εd < 0 and εsi > 0, we have −1 <   < 0, or  from (6') 
because ssi ≥ 0,   > 0 . Therefore we have  , which is (1). For producer group i, 
the expression of ∆PWi in (4) can be rewritten as 
    (4') 
In (4'), because dp < 0, pi, qs,i, εsi, hi > 0, we then have  
  .  (4") 
Equation (4") also shows that a larger qs,i and qs,ihi lead to a larger ∆PWi, because dp < 0, which 
together proves (2).  
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We know from discussion in Appendix A that dp/p + K > 0 for εd < 0 and εsi > 0; therefore for any 
dp/p > K, (32) > 0. This proves that a larger dp/p + Ki leads to a more positive ∆PW, and thus the 
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APPENDIX B: DISTINCTION OF ON-FARM AND OFF-FARM TYPE PRODUCERS IN 
TAKESHIMA (2008) 
This study is partly based on the empirical results in Takeshima (2008). Although many results in 
Takeshima (2008) are irrelevant to this study, those that are relevant are discussed here.  
Separation of On-farm Sellers and Off-farm Sellers 
Takeshima (2008) builds a hypothesis that cassava farmers who plan to sell cassava can be categorized 
into two types: on-farm sellers, who plan to sell cassava at the farmgate, and off-farm sellers, who plan to 
sell cassava at the market. Each type of farmer exhibits different elasticity of production and home 
consumption. Each type also tests the alternative hypothesis that both types of farmers do not exhibit 
different production and home consumption elasticity. Takeshima (2008) supports the former hypothesis. 
This study follows the findings in Takeshima (2008) and applies different elasticities and 
empirical distributions for two types of cassava producers, as was shown in Table 6. Autarkic farmers are 
categorized into one of the aforementioned seller types by using the regression results for probit in 
Takeshima (2008); an autarkic producer i is assumed an on-farm seller if  
  , or    (33) 
and otherwise is an off-farm seller.  
The assumption of separate types of farmers, however, should not significantly affect the key 
findings in this study, as both CEDM and AEDM are calibrated based on this assumption. 
Estimation of Farmgate Price for Off-farm Seller 
The results of (25) and (26) are shown in Table 10; Table 11 shows the summary statistics of 
and the calculated prices  and  .  
Table 10. Regressions (25) and (26) 
  Regression (25)  Regression (26) 
Dependent variables     
         
Region 2  .076  (.383)     
Region 3  –.328  (.497)     
Region 4  .619  (.379)     
Region 5  .503  (.394)     
Region 6  .437  (.362)     
Fresh-tuber (yes = 1)  –.646  (.193)     
Flour (yes = 1)  1.116***  (.208)     
Dried tuber (yes = 1)  .026  (.309)     
January  .139  (.157)     
February  –.366***  (.116)     
March  .189  (.119)     
April  –.171  (.121)     
May  –.079  (.127)     
June  .157  (.173)     
July  –.175  (.200)     
pr Prob(  = on farm seller| ) 0.5 i ix >
pr
pr ˆ 0.5 i x γ <
f
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Table 10. Continued 
  Regression (25)  Regression (26) 
Dependent variables     
         
August  –.063  (.174)     
September  –.048  (.291)     
October  –.068  (.239)     
November  –.503  (.326)     
Distance to paved road (10km)  –.003  (.009)     
Distance to passable road (10km)  –.006  (.007)     
Distance to phone (10km)      1.483  (3.219) 
Off farm type seller (yes = 1)  .203*  (.109)     
      .309***  (.088) 
Membership to cooperative (yes = 1)      –.460  (.307) 
Household head education (year)      –.061  (.050) 
Constant  3.397***  (.409)  .702**  (.336) 
R
2  .708  .387 
Number of observations  192  53 
Source: Author.  
Table 11. Summary statistics of estimated prices, per-unit transaction cost (US cents/kilogram, 
fresh-tuber) 
  Mean  Median  Min.  Max. 
Farmgate sales price ( )  5.22  3.47  0.28  40.09 
Consumption market price ( )  12.92  5.49  0.55  119.94 
Per-unit transaction costs ( )  7.70  1.01  0.16  118.58 
Weighted farmgate sales price ( )  2.50  2.47  1.93  3.54 
Weighted consumption market price ( )  3.35  3.32  2.67  4.48 
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